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ARGUMENT
L

TAMARA PROPERLY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE
In section I of his Brief, David argued that Tamara failed to marshal the evidence.

See David's Br. at 12-16. "A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all
record evidence that supports the challenged finding." U.R.A.P. 24(a)(9). David
concedes that 'Tamara does make an effort to fulfill the first part of the marshaling
requirement. .. ." by "list[ing] all of the evidence supportive of the trial court's findings."
David's Br. at 13. David argues that 'Tamara fails in the second step of the marshaling
process, explaining why all of the evidence taken together does not support the trial
court's findings." Id. Specifically, David contends that Tamara did not fulfill the second
step of the marshaling requirement regarding (1) challenging the court's reduction of her
monthly expenses; and (2) challenging the court's imputation of income to her. See id. at
13-14.

A. Tamara properly marshaled the evidence in her argument that the trial
court abused its discretion in reducing her monthly expenses
Tamara fulfilled the second step of the marshalling requirement by pointing out several
mistakes the court made in reducing her monthly expenses. First, Tamara argued that the trial
court made inadequate findings of fact regarding the reduction of her expenses and
deductions. Tamara's Br. at p. 24-26 (section I.E.); see also section VIII, infra. "'A trial
court's failure to provide adequate findings [regarding the statutory factors] is reversible error
when the facts [that logically support the findings] are not clear from the record.'" Connell v.
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Cornell, 2010 UT App 139, ^ 12, No. 20080619-CA (filed May 27, 2010) (alteration in
original) (quoting Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, \ 17, 169 P.3d 754).
Second, Tamara argued that the inclusion of the children's expenses in her
expenses caused the court to miscalculate her needs. See Tamara's Br. at 20-21 (section
I.C.2.); see also section IV, infra. Utah Code section 30-3-5(8)(a)(i) requires a court
making an alimony determination to consider "the financial conditions and needs of the
recipient spouse." UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(i) (Supp. 2007). Combining the
needs and expenses of the children with the recipient's needs falls short of the statutory
mandate to consider the "recipient's" needs. See id.
Third, Tamara argued that the trial court abused its discretion in reducing her
expenses by failing to properly consider the standard of living the parties enjoyed during
the marriage. See Tamara's Br. at 23-25 (section I.D); see also section VI., infra. Based
on the foregoing arguments, it is clear that Tamara complied with the second prong of the
marshaling requirement in pointing out mistakes the court made in reducing Tamara's
expenses which constituted an abuse of discretion.
B. Tamara complied with the second prong of the marshaling requirement in
her argument that the court abused its discretion in imputing income to her
Tamara argued in section I.G. of her Brief that the court abused its discretion by
imputing income to her. The court imputed an additional $ 733.65 (approximately 42%) to
Tamara's income, increasing it from $ 1,766.35 to $ 2,500.00. (See R. 173.) The court
imputed additional income to Tamara based on the testimony of an employment expert (R.
172.), and on the following findings: Tamara is highly educated (R. 172, \ 1 l(iv)), was a
2

software engineer from approximately 1986 to 1990 (R. 171-72), and conducted a "relatively
minimal job search" before obtaining her position at Jet Blue (R. 171, ^ 13).
Tamara argued in her brief that "it was an abuse of discretion to impute additional
income to Tamara where she was 53 years old (R. 238 at 6), and had been out of the
workforce for approximately sixteen years (R. 156, ^ 15)." Tamara's Br. at 27-28 (section
I.G.). Although Tamara does have education and some experience as a software engineer
(R. 171-72), this field has changed drastically since she was in the workforce (about
sixteen years ago (R. 156, ^ 15)). Based on the arguments in her Brief, Tamara complied
with the second prong of the marshaling requirement in her argument that the court
abused its discretion in imputing additional income to her.
II.
THE COURT IMPUTED INCOME TO TAMARA BASED ON DR.
FARNSWORTH'S TESTIMONY REGARDING TAMARA'S CURRENT SKILLS
David asserts in section II of his Brief that Tamara misrepresented the trial court's
findings when she argued in section I.G. of her Brief that to seek additional education, as
suggested by Dr. Farnsworth, would require her to leave her present job and she would
not have income during the retraining period. David argues that Tamara was asserting
that the trial court made its imputation of income findings based on her ability to earn
after undergoing retraining,. See David's Br. at 16-17. However, on page 17 of his Brief,
David cites Tamara's own Brief (in paragraphs 16 and 17, on page 17 and 18) for the
court's statement that the court had imputed income based on her current skills.
Therefore, Tamara asserted, and does not dispute, that the court imputed income to
Tamara based on Dr. Farnsworth's testimony regarding Tamara's current skills.
3

•III. IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO INCLUDE CHILD SUPPORT
AS PART OF TAMARA'S INCOME EVEN WHERE SHE INCLUDED THE
EXPENSES OF HER CHILDREN IN HER FINANCIAL DECLARATION
Tamara objected to the trial court's inclusion of child support in her income in
calculating alimony. (R. 183.) Utah case law has established that "child support. . .
should not be considered as income to [the recipient] for purposes of calculating
alimony." Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT App 2 1 9 4 12, 983 P.2d 1103. David
does not dispute that the trial court included child support in Tamara's income when
calculating child support. See David's Br. at 17-19. David attempts to distinguish
Williamson from the instant case by arguing that in Williamson, "it is not possible to
determine . . . whether the requesting spouse . . . included the children's expenses as part
of her monthly expenses." David's Br. at 19.
David seems to advocate a rule that would require a trial court to include child
support in the income of the recipient where she includes the expenses of the children in
her financial declaration. However, such a rule would ignore the fact that, under Utah
law, both divorced parents have an obligation to support their children financially.
Although Tamara, as the custodial parent, does not send a check to David each month,
she still has a child support obligation of $283.80 per month, according to the Child
Support Obligation Worksheet. (See R. at 160.) As Tamara has the obligation to support
her children, it is clear that to some extent at least, the expenses of her children are her
expenses. Therefore, it was appropriate for her to include the expenses of her children on
her financial declaration.
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Furthermore, allocating living expenses between a parent and children might
prove complex enough to require an accountant. It would also be a speculative endeavor,
likely inappropriate for a sworn financial declaration.
The trial court stated that most custodial parents include the expenses of their
children in their financial declarations. (See R. at 239.) Although it is not clear from the
Williamson opinion whether the custodial parent included the children's expenses as part
of her own, it is customary to do so. Therefore, the Williamson holding which prohibits
the inclusion of child support in the recipient's income should be applicable here.
IV. THE COURT'S CALCULATION OF TAMARA'S NEEDS WAS SKEWED
WHERE HER EXPENSES WERE CONSIDERED ALONG WITH THE
EXPENSES OF HER CHILDREN
David asserted that Tamara cannot claim that the court abused its discretion by
including the children's expenses as part of her monthly expenses when Tamara's
monthly budget included the expenses of the children. See David's Br. at 19. A court's
consideration of an alimony recipient's expenses along with those of her children is not
normally an abuse of discretion. However, in this case, combining Tamara's expenses
along with those of her children obfuscated the court's view of Tamara9s expenses. The
following hypothetical example using the figures in the case will show that this occurred.
Let us begin by making the reasonable assumption that the children's expenses are
equal to the Base Combined Child Support Obligation of $1,892.00. (R. at 160.) If we
subtract the children's expenses of $ 1,892.00 from $ 4,716.52 (the court's determination
of Tamara's expenses which were combined with those of her children (R. at 173-74)),
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we are left with $ 2,824.52, which represents Tamara's expenses separate from those of
her children. The court found David's reasonable expenses to be $ 3,766.53 (R. 175, ^
22), which is $ 942.01 (about 33%) greater than the expenses of $ 2,824.52 attributable to
Tamara in the above hypothetical. The disparity seems particularly unjust where Tamara
has monthly prescription and copay expenses of $ 483.99 because of a traumatic brain
injury she suffered in 2002 (See R. 238 at 24.)
One more concise hypothetical will illustrate this point perhaps even more clearly.
Suppose the court had determined Tamara's expenses, without including the expenses of
the children, to be the same as David's expenses: $ 3,766.53 (R. 175, % 22). Tamara's
income, excluding child support, would have been $ 2,379.43, which includes a net
imputed income of $ 2,175 (R. at 175) and dividend income of $254.43 (R. 173, If 17).
Tamara's shortfall (her expenses of $ 3,766.53 minus her income of $ 2,379.43) would be
$ 1,387.10, which is $ 632.71 more than the court calculated Tamara's shortfall to be ($
754.39 (R. 174, ^ 19)). Both examples give David a substantial greater lifestyle than
Tamara.
Tamara does not argue, as David asserts she does, that a court is required to
equalize the parties' expenses. See David's Br. at 21. However, the great disparity in
expenses leaves the reader with a definite impression that the court abused its discretion
in determining Tamara's expenses. Tamara does not believe the court would have
decreased her expenses so drastically if the court had been able to view her expenses
separate from those of her children. At a minimum, the court should have performed the
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exercises above to ensure that the court was not reducing Tamara's expenses below the
standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage.
V.
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO CALCULATE
TAMARA'S INCOME AND EXPENSES, AS WELL AS DAVID'S ABILITY TO
PAY ALIMONY, AFTER THE CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION TERMINATES
In her Brief, Tamara argued that "it was an abuse of discretion for the court to . ..
fail to calculate the effect of the termination of child support on her needs, her income,
and David's ability to provide support." Tamara's Br. at 21-22 (I.C.3.). Although David
denies that it was an abuse of discretion to fail to calculate David's ability to pay alimony
after his child support obligation terminates, he does not address Tamara's assertion that
it was also an abuse of discretion to fail to calculate what her needs and expenses will be
after the termination of David's child support obligation. See David's Br. at 22-23.
David asserts that the court did not abuse its discretion because the alimony award
is capped at the recipient's demonstrated need. See Id. Tamara does not believe that
David's argument squarely addresses the issue she presents, which is whether a court
may ignore the imminent termination of child support when undertaking its statutory duty
to consider "the financial conditions and needs of the recipient spouse" and "the ability of
the payor spouse to provide support" in its alimony determination. UTAH CODE ANN. §
30-3-5(8)(a)(i), (iii) (Supp. 2007).
In section I.C.3 of her Brief, Tamara showed that "[a]fter David's child support
obligations terminate in July 2013 (R. 182), his ability to pay alimony will have increased
in the amount of child support ($ 1,582.70), from $ 1,001.47 to $ 2,584.17." Tamara's
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income and needs as found by the court will also change drastically when child support
terminates.
Considering the recipient's needs and expenses as well as the payor's ability to
pay alimony after the child support obligation ends is especially important in a case such
as this where child support will end shortly but the alimony award could potentially last a
long time (until Sept. 30, 2029 in this case (R. 212, f 6)). Child support terminates
shortly for one child and in July 2013 for the other child. (R. 182.) Consequently, the
court's inclusion of child support in its calculations provide an incorrect picture of
Tamara's needs and expenses and David's ability to pay alimony for the vast majority of
the 20 years and 2 months (R. 212) the alimony order could potentially last.
David asserts that the court did not abuse its discretion "in declining to speculate
as to David's ability to pay alimony when his child-support obligation terminates."
David's Br. at 23. However, the effect of the termination of child support on David's
ability to pay alimony merely involves the addition of David's disposable income to the
amount of child support he is not longer required to pay, and no speculation is necessary.
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DETERMING
ALIMONY WHERE IT DID NOT PROPERLY CONSIDER TAMARA'S
STANDARD OF LIVING DURING THE MARRIAGE
This Court recently stated that an alimony "award should advance, as much as
possible, the purposes of alimony by assisting the parties in achieving the same standard
of living they enjoyed during the marriage, equalizing the parties' respective standards of
living, and preventing either spouse from becoming a public charge." Fish v. Fish, 2010
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UT App 292,1f 12, No. 20090916 (filed Oct 21, 2010). David argues that "the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in failing to award alimony sufficient to allow Tamara to
enjoy the lifestyle of the marriage" (David's Br. at 23), apparently conceding that the
alimony award was not sufficient to provide Tamara with her marital standard of living.
David argued that 'Tamara's implied argument is that the trial court abused its
discretion by reducing her expenses, which the trial court should have accepted at face
value . . . ." David's Br. at 25. However, Tamara's argument is that the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to consider her marital standard of living in reducing her
expenses. See Tamara's Br. at 23-24 (I.D.). In section I.D. of her Brief, Tamara quoted
Batty v. Batty for the proposition that the "Wife's needs 'are assessed in light of the
standard of living [the parties] had during marriage.'" Batty v. Batty, 2006 UT App 506, ^f
5, 153 P.3d 827 (alterations in original) (quoting Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 542
(Utah 1991)).
Evidence that the trial court did not consider the standard of living enjoyed during
the marriage when reducing Tamara's expenses is found in the trial court's basis for
reducing her food and household expenses: "ii. The food and household expenses were
reduced [from 1,013.42] to $750.00 based upon the Court's experience that a monthly
amount of $250.00 is reasonable for each person residing in the household." (R. at 174.)
The court's reason for reducing Tamara's expenses was not based on the standard of
living enjoyed by the parties during the marriage, but was instead based on "the Court's
experience" of what is "reasonable." (Id.) The Court's experience of what constitutes
reasonable food and household expenses likely includes the expenses of past litigants
9

who were not before the court and such considerations run contrary to the duty to assess
the alimony recipient's needs in light of the standard of living during the marriage.
Additional evidence that the trial court did not consider the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage when reducing Tamara's expenses is found in the trial
court's basis for reducing her telephone expense: "iii. The telephone expense was
reduced [from $ 363.68] to $250.00 based upon the Court's experience that the services
can be provided for much less than petitioner is now paying." (R. at 174.) Instead of
determining Tamara's expenses based on the standard of living of the parties during the
marriage, the trial court took the role of the monitoring Tamara's expenses to determine
if they were wasteful, immoderate, or extravagant.
Furthermore, the court reduced Tamara's expenses in four other categories without
providing any findings or rationale whatsoever. (See R. 173-74; see also section VIII.,
infra.) This is especially troubling because it is likely that the court decreased those
expenses for improper reasons, as it did with her food and household expense and her
telephone expense. The court thought that Tamara was too charitable, reducing her
gifts and donations expenses by $ 170.00, from $ 270.00 to $ 100.00, without providing a
basis. (R. 174, ^ 18(vi).) The court also reduced auto expenses by $ 165.00, personal care
and gym expenses by $ 187.94, and the clothing allowance by $ 56.97, all without
providing a basis for the reductions. (R. 174.) It should be noted that Tamara provided
testimony regarding her expenses at trial. (See e.g. R. 238 at 25-26.) Because the court
did not properly consider Tamara's standard of living during the marriage when reducing
her expenses, but made reductions based on other considerations, she asks this Court to
10

remand her case to the trial court to consider her expenses based on her standard of living
during the marriage.

VII. T H E COURT'S M A T H E M A T I C A L E R R O R S H O U L D BE ADDRESSED

ON REMAND
Tamara asserts that the trial court made a mathematical error which caused the
court to miscalculate David's monthly disposable income by $628.02. Tamara5s Br. at
26-27 (section I.F.). David did not dispute that the court made a mathematical error. See
David's Br. at 25-26. Instead, he asserts that any error is harmless because an alimony
award is capped at the demonstrated need of the recipient. See Id. at 26. It is true that an
alimony award may not exceed a recipient's demonstrated need. Jensen v. Jensen, 2008
UT App 392, ^ 13, 197 P.3d 117. However, if this court remands for a redetermination
of Tamara's need for alimony, she asks this Court to also require the trial court to correct
the mathematical error in computing David's disposable income.
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO
MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT IN REDUCING TAMARA'S
EXPENSES AND DEDUCTIONS TO HER INCOME
The trial court reduced eight of Tamara's expense categories and reduced four of
them without providing a rationale or setting forth factual findings that would justify a
reduction. {See R. at 173-74.) David argues that the case of Andrus v. Andrus, "does not
require that the trial court make a specific finding of the reason why the court accepted,
reduced or increased each claimed expense., All that is required is that the finding be
sufficiently specific so that the reviewing court can make a determination as to what
reduction the trial court regarding each expense." David's Br. at 27 (citing Andrus v.
11

Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, 169 P.3d 754). David thus argues that because the Andrus
court did not explicitly state that a court is required to state a basis for reducing a party's
expenses, no such basis is required. See David's Br. at 27. However, as set forth below,
the Willey cases show that a court is required to state a basis for reducing a party's
expenses.
David argues that the court need not make any findings when reducing a party's
claimed expenses, other than merely stating the amount by which the court reduced each
expense. See id. If courts were to follow David's reading of Andrus, judicial review of a
court's reduction of a party's expenses would be effectively precluded. Without findings
of fact stating the reasons for the reductions, a reviewing court would not be able to
determine whether a court had abused its discretion . See Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226,
230 (Utah 1997) (stating that "[w]ithout adequate findings of fact, there can be no
meaningful appellate review").
Tamara relied on Willey v. Willey for the proposition that a court must make
adequate findings of fact when making ''adjustments . . . in the parties' monthly
expenses." Willey v. Willey, 914 P.2d 1149, 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). However,
David states that the Willey case just referenced was overruled by the Utah Supreme
Court in Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226 (Utah 1997) and summarizes that case. David's
Br. at 29. Tamara asserts that the Utah Supreme Court did not overrule the Utah Court of
Appeals' holding that a court must make adequate findings of fact when adjusting the
monthly expenses of the parties. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the rule that
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"the trial court in exercising its discretion must make the findings of fact explicit in
. • # ' •

•

support of its legal conclusions. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997).
In Willey, the Court of Appeals stated that the findings of fact regarding Ms.
Willey's unreimbursed medical expenses were inadequate. Id. at 229. However, "instead
of accepting the trial court's findings or remanding the matter a second time to the trial
court for further action, the court of appeals, on its own, accepted at face value the
statement of expenses as submitted by Rosalind Willey and increased the alimony to
reflect the entire amount claimed." Id.
The Utah Supreme Court was clear that the Court of Appeals should have
remanded the case to the trial court for further findings if it determined that the reduction
of Ms. Willey's expenses was not supported by adequate findings. See id. The Utah
Supreme Court overruled the Court of Appeals and decided that the trial court's findings
of facts supporting its reduction of Ms. Willey's unreimbursed medical expenses were
adequate. Id. at 231. The trial court's adequate findings included the following: "'while
the record shows that defendant had major surgery in the fall of 1991, there is nothing in
the record to establish why the ongoing expenses would continue on a monthly basis.'"
Id. at 231. We can thus see from the Willey decisions that adequate findings of fact are
required in reduction of the parties' expenses.
Findings of fact are especially important where a court's decision does not follow
logically from the facts in the case. For example, the court failed to provide adequate
findings in reducing the monthly deductions from Tamara's income. The court increased
Tamara's income by $ 733.65 (approximately 42%), from $ 1,766.35 to $ 2,500.00 by
13

imputing additional income to her. (See R. 173.) At the same time, the court decreased
her reasonable monthly deductions by $ 22.05, from $ 397.05 to $ 375.00 (Id.), and did
not provide any findings supporting its determination that $ 375.00 was a proper monthly
deduction. (Id.) Because deductions, such as taxes, typically increase as income
increases, it does not appear logical to find that deductions decreased even while income
increased 42%. The trial court should be required to make findings in its reductions of
Tamara's expenses and deductions to allow this Court to decide whether it abused its
discretion.
IX. DAVID'S ASSERTION THAT TAMARA MADE MISREPRESENTATIONS
IN HER FINANCIAL DECLARATION IS WITHOUT SUFFICIENT BASIS
At two places in his Brief, David accuses Tamara of making untrue statements in
the financial declaration she submitted to the trial court. See David's Br. at 18, 21. He
asserted that Tamara claimed "expenses related to the children that were not actually
being incurred, such as piano lessons. (R. 174, ^f 18(v).)" David's Br. at 18.
However, a review of the record does not support David's contention that Tamara
was not truthful in her financial declaration. During direct examination, Tamara was
asked whether her daughters had activities. Tamara responded: 'They do. They haven't
had very much in the past two years, but one of them was taking piano lessons. She's no
longer doing that." (R. 238 at 14-15.) The fact that Tamara volunteered this information
on direct examination shows that she did not have the intent to make any such
misrepresentations to the court. One explanation that David apparently did not consider
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is that the child may have stopped taking piano lessons between the time when Tamara
completed her financial declaration and the trial.

CONCLUSION
Tamara properly marshaled the evidence in this case by setting forth the factual
findings that supported the trial court's determination and pointed out the mistakes made
by the court which constituted an abuse of discretion. The trial court abused its discretion
in its alimony determination by including child support in Tamara's income. The court
also abused its discretion by failing to make adequate findings of fact in reducing
Tamara's expenses and by failing to properly consider Tamara's standard of living during
the marriage. Tamara asks this Court to remand this case to the trial court for a proper
alimony determination. As this was a marriage of over twenty years, Tamara asks that
direction be given to the trial court to "advance, as much as possible the purposes of
alimony by assisting the parties in achieving the same standard of living they enjoyed
during the marriage, [and] equalizing the parties' respective standards of living." Fish v.
Fish, 2010 UT App 292, \ 12, No. 20090916 (filed Oct 21, 2010).
DATED this W ] j i a y of January, 2011.
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